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0. Introduction
The second half of the 19th century is a period of great 
transformations in monetary history. The crisis of me-
tallic systems and the expansion of fiat means of pay-
ment are some of the salient events of the time. In the 
case of the French monetary system, the most signif-
icant facts during this time was the expansion of the 
Bank of France with its consequent de facto monopoly 
on note issue within the entire national territory2 and 
some periods of non-convertibility. Even with an im-
portant expansion of the Bank of France’s paper-mon-
ey under Napoleon’s First Empire, the French mone-
tary system was behind the development of the circu-
lation of paper-money attained by England or even by 
northern European countries (Cameron 1967).
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Cameron (1967) attributes the backwardness of 
France’s banking and monetary systems to “the mo-
nopolistic position of the Bank of France and in the 
restricted vision and inflexible attitudes of the men 
who controlled its destinies” (p: 127). In fact, since 
the consolidation of the First Empire [1804], until the 
instauration of the Second Empire [1852] witnessed 
a political and economic struggle between the pre-
tentions of the Bank of France to consolidate its issu-
ing monopoly in the entire national territory and the 
commercial bankers. In a context of the consolidation 
of the Industrial Revolution, and an increasing expo-
sure to international commerce and the expansion of 
a desire for consolidating an economic empire, the 
needs for a more flexible financial system were press-
ing among the liberal ideologists and the bourgeoisie.
The bi-metallic system, established in France 
along the 19th century, required arbitrages between 
silver and gold, and created an active monetary mar-
ket. The presence of this market developed a vigor-
ous activity of different actors, including commercial 
banks and the Bank of France, and led to an increas-
ing debate about the necessity to liberate the creation 
of more sophisticated means of payments. Flandreau 
(1996) shows that the Franco-Prussian War (1870) 
abruptly ended this period of experimentation and 
development of monetary ideas. Furthermore, the pe-
riod of the ‘Parisian monopoly’ of the Bank of France 
was followed by a short period of a freer legislation 
on the creation of private banks from 1866 to 1873. 
This legislation was brutally stopped by a succession 
of political and monetary crises during the first half 
of the 19th century. As a result, as mentioned, the 
French banking system felt behind compared with 
similar countries. 
This relative underdevelopment also has to do 
with a general feeling of apprehension the French 
people experienced regarding non-metallic money 
exacerbated by the monetary and social crises. How-
ever, the main intellectual debate in France on mon-
etary matters during this period revolved around the 
instauration of a system of free banking3 against a 
paper-money monopoly in the hands of the Bank of 
France. A group of very influential policy makers, 
opinion-makers and professional economists revived 
the defense of laissez-faire systems of bank money 
issue. In the meanwhile, in England, the well-known 
debate between the so-called banking and currency 
schools ended with the triumph of the latter, impos-
ing a very conservative policy on the Bank of Eng-
land concerning paper-money supply. 
At the same time, a theoretical revolution was 
taking place in Economics: the so-called Marginal 
Revolution. Two important French authors emerge, 
one as a forerunner and another as a main figure in 
this intellectual movement: Augustin Cournot and 
Léon Walras. As most of the authors of the Marginal 
3 Some authors sustain there was a period of free banking in France before 1803; however, as said, regional paper-money had a very restricted circu-
lation whereas the Bank of France’s paper money circulated beyond the Parisian region.
Revolution, they had some ideas on monetary theory. 
Their contributions were part of the crucial monetary 
debates of their time and occupied a place beyond the 
pure applied issues about the management of money 
supply. 
They participated in those debates as pure theo-
reticians and as revolutionary thinkers. Their contri-
butions on this matter benefited from their solid the-
oretical frameworks and even they agreed on most 
fundamental theoretical aspects, their grasp on his-
torical changes and their differences on monetary is-
sues bring into sight a theoretical richness regarding 
their positions on paper-money that has not received 
much attention. 
The changes in the economy had an important 
influence on their theoretical contributions to the 
transformation of Economics. Nevertheless, most 
of the analysis on these authors has focused on their 
theoretical positions. Their contributions aside from 
pure theory have been considered, in the best of cas-
es, as pure theoretical speculation, and most of the 
time as a minor part of their works. Little attention 
has been given to their views on economic policy and 
economic regulation. Regarding the regulation of the 
monetary system, Walras and Cournot, despite their 
proximity in economic and monetary theory, have 
very different stands. Their greatest differences can 
be found in their views about the convenience of the 
issuing of paper money and fiat money in general. 
Whereas Walras is against bank notes, even if com-
ing from a central bank, Cournot has a more moder-
ate position. He accepts the need for bank notes even 
without a strict adjustment to metal reserves. It can 
be ascertained that Cournot believes discretionary 
monetary regulation is convenient and acceptable, 
while Walras believes the only acceptable monetary 
system is one based exclusively on the stability of the 
value of money under a monetary rule following the 
strict equivalence between metallic reserves (bimetal 
to be exact) and circulating money. 
This paper aims at bringing forth the reasons that 
explain this difference because of the interpretation 
each one of the authors gives to the empirical facts 
of the monetary system taking place at the end of the 
19th century. These facts produce diverging develop-
ments in each author’s theoretical positions. Walras 
consolidates an extreme position based on the view 
of money as a commodity, the value of which is de-
termined as the price of the service of a necessary 
capital good that assures the circulation of com-
modities. This good monetary circulation needs to 
be differentiated from the circulation of bank issued 
paper-money, which lies at the origin of deep real 
crises through an evil cumulative process distorting 
economic equilibrium and most importantly econom-
ic justice. Cournot, on his side, conceives money as 
something in-between a commodity and an institu-
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tion and makes no special difference between bank 
issued paper-money and metallic money. This view is 
most evident in his two non-mathematical economic 
works published in 18774 which consolidate his po-
sition regarding the need and the desirable effects of 
the existence of paper money, already present in his 
18635 work but absent from his well-known mathe-
matical theoretical work (Cournot A. , 2001 [1838])6.
I will show the difference between these two 
thinkers and will evidence Cournot’s ability to under-
stand more clearly than Walras the evolution of the 
monetary system of his days. Walras, instead, trying 
to guarantee the coherence of his pure theory with 
his applied theory, is unable to accept the evolution 
toward a monetary system based on fiat money. This 
paper then aims at contributing to the differentiation 
of the authors of the so-called Marginalist School, 
underlining, once again, the richness of the Margin-
alist period and questioning the commonly accepted 
view of the homogeneity of their ideas.
The paper is structured as follows: in the first sec-
tion I consider Walras’s approach to the problem of 
bank issued paper-money as a theoretical construc-
tion founded on his pure economics. A critical ex-
position of his pure theory of money is thus needed 
before the theory of banking is analyzed. The second 
section reconstructs Cournot’s main ideas on mon-
ey and paper-money as they were developed in his 
non-mathematical economic works. Then, in a third 
section I present an evaluation of the main differenc-
es between both authors viewed against the monetary 
debates of their time.
1. Walras’s desideratum for pure metallic-money 
and the threatening character of paper-money
Walras’s analysis of circulation takes us directly from 
the abstract world of pure theory to a highly practical 
reality. In fact, Walras considered money as a pure 
practical object not necessarily having its place with-
in his pure economics. However, the evolution of his 
monetary theory shows how money became an inte-
gral part of his Éléments d’économie politique pure 
(Walras 1988) having its place as the closing device 
of his whole model. The introduction of a decentral-
ised exchange process implies breaking with the cen-
tralised (i.e. well organised) form of the tâtonnement 
sur bons. Beyond this methodological change, it is 
interesting to note that Walras adds some novelties 
4 Revue sommaire des doctrines économiques (Cournot A. 1982 [1877]), henceforth Doctrines.
5 Principes de la théorie des richesses (Cournot A. 1863), henceforth Principes. 
6 It is worth noticing that this last work had an important influence on Walras, who uses it for his own analysis about the determination of the value 
of money. In fact, in the second edition of his Éléments d’économie politique pure (henceforth EEPP), the 39th lesson dealt with Cournot’s analysis 
of the absolute and relative values and, in particular, with the fluctuations of the value of money.
7 Baranzini presents a clearcut analysis of this evolution of Walras’s ideas on crisis (Baranzini 2001)
8 Théorie mathématique du billet de banque (Walras, Théorie mathématique du billet de banque, 1992): originally presented in 1879 before the So-
ciété Vaudoise des Sciences Naturelles.
9 See (Baranzini 2001), (Bauvert, 2004), (Kuenne, 1961) and (Hilton, 1995).
10 See (Bridel, 1997) and (Rebeyrol, 1998) for detailed expositions and discussions on the evolution of Walras’s monetary thought.
11 In a paper coauthored with V. Bignon, we present a critical discussion of Walras’s monetary theory (Alvarez & Bignon 2013).
to the hypothesis of perfect competition to integrate 
his monetary theory. But this is a high-risk chirurgi-
cal modification for him because its main goal is to 
avoid any disturbance of the normative properties of 
equilibrium allocations.
Monetary issues are related, even in the pure the-
oretical arena of his EEPP, to the possibility of eco-
nomic crisis. In fact, it can be said that Walras regards 
monetary circulation as the door to the introduction 
of natural endogenous sources of crisis, not only as 
the artificial crisis created by a bad public interven-
tion. Some authors have underestimated the impor-
tance of this “devil inside” feature of monetary cir-
culation in Walras’s monetary works. The common 
view on the walrasian notion of crisis is summarized 
by the following statement:
Perfectly in line with the century-old Classical tra-
dition, and of course with the other marginalist contri-
butions to cycle theory (notably those by Jevons, Mar-
shall, and Menger), a crisis is considered as a short-run, 
temporary oscillation around a long-run ‘natural’ equi-
librium determined by `real’ variables only. (Bridel 
1997, p. 49)
Even if this is true for Walras’s early (1860’s) 
works, his studies on money and banking led him to 
consider crisis are not only part of a short-run oscil-
lation triggered exclusively by “real variables”7. In 
his Mathematical Theory of Bank Notes (henceforth 
TMBB8) Walras presents paper-money as a danger-
ous threat for the real economy, exploring monetary 
causes of real crisis. Most Walras scholars admit this 
text as proof of deep differences or even incompat-
ibility between his pure and applied economics9. It 
is precisely on these grounds that I will try to recon-
struct Walras’s attempt to theorize money under its 
different forms, and to disentangle his radical stance 
against any form of paper-money circulation.
a. The nature of money in Walras’s Pure 
Economics
We must take a short detour by Walras’s pure theory of 
money to understand the nature of paper-money issued 
by private banks. In his EEPP, after a lot of transfor-
mation across different editions10, lesson 29 presents a 
general equilibrium analysis of the circulation of mon-
ey. Beyond the problems11 this analysis might have, our 
interest here is on the economic nature of money. 
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As has been often discussed, the epistemological 
structure of Warlas’s economics is based on the divi-
sion and interaction between pure and applied eco-
nomics, the EEPP being the main contribution and 
synthesis of his pure economics12. This relation is 
complex but, in a nutshell, one can say that pure eco-
nomics represents the ideal functioning of an econ-
omy where commutative justice is respected. This 
simply means that no agent can profit from any form 
of economic power. This assumption is materialized 
in the hypothesis of price-taking as the foundation of 
perfect competition.
But Walras goes beyond the idea that perfect com-
petition ensures commutative justice (or in modern 
terminology: Pareto-efficiency). He introduces other 
implicit conditions that must be fulfilled to assure 
that a general equilibrium state coincides with a fair 
allocation or that it complies with commutative jus-
tice. Money appears related with one of these con-
ditions in a double sense. First, money is necessary 
for a decentralized exchange economy to attain final 
(equilibrium) allocations from an initial endowment 
situation. Second, and more crucial here, the process 
of exchange or the circulation of wealth must be neu-
tral regarding the real equilibrium allocations. Mon-
ey must be neutral, and the quantity theory rule must 
hold. This is the result Walras struggled on along dif-
ferent versions of his pure monetary theory.
In this ideal framework, money is a particular ob-
ject that allows synchronization between payments 
and earnings. It is only a problem that consumer 
agents —mainly workers— face that motivates the 
demand for money: their expenses take place before 
they receive their earnings. On the other hand, entre-
preneurs need to have enough money to cover their 
circulating capital expenses. Both types of agents de-
mand money provided it is a generally accepted me-
dium of exchange. 
Money demand is thus based on a simple techno-
logical social problem in a decentralized economy. 
Even if Walras’s explanation is different from the 
typical “absence of double coincidence problem”, the 
rationale for monetary circulation is essentially the 
same: money is demanded as medium of exchange 
and no other reason is given. However, Walras makes 
a confusing statement in this theoretical analysis of 
the nature of money. He presents the stock of money 
as a form of capital held by agents, following Kuenne:
Note the inclusion of money as an asset yielding 
saleable services; since one sells the services of money 
for one “week” by lending, Walras’ money economy is 
of necessity one with borrowing and lending, and the 
coexistence of money and a loan market in it a requi-
site. (Kuenne 1961, p. 96)
The quantity of money that is needed to circu-
late the entire wealth for a given period is there-
12 See Jaffé (1983)
fore established in the real sphere. It is the solution 
to the general equilibrium price quantities vectors 
that solves the necessities of circulation. Of course, 
Walras recognizes that a unit of money can be used 
in a sequence of different payments, but this veloc-
ity of circulation is taken as given and the obvious 
quantity theory formula (équation de la circulation) 
holds. Walras dismisses consequence of the nature of 
money as a form of capital and he concentrates his 
argument on the nature of the instantaneous availa-
bility service of cash holdings rather than on the in-
tertemporal feature. However, as I will show further 
on, this subterfuge cannot last for long as he needs 
to confront more realistic forms of money, the bank 
issued paper money.
Walrasian pure monetary theory thus results in a 
very traditional conception of the effects of the quan-
tity of money on nominal prices. Money, being a 
technological device to facilitate exchanges, its “ser-
vices” are the cheapest the highest its supply. Prices 
and monetary supply are related in a positive manner. 
What is more important for our purposes here, money 
supply is given and exogenous all along this theoret-
ical exposition and money is not a commodity. These 
last features of Walras’s pure monetary theory are of 
great importance.
A difficult point concerning Warlas’ theory of 
money is his normative approach on the nature of 
money. Even if Walras recognizes the possibility for 
the existence of non-metallic means of payment as 
substitutes of a commodity money, he emphasizes 
the necessity to avoid the endogenous creation of 
money. In particular, he advocates for the necessity 
to control, and even to inhibit, the development of the 
role of commercial Banks in the creation of means of 
payments.
Concerning the non-commodity character of 
money, even if the monetary circulation of his pure 
economics is not bank issued paper-money, one can 
understand that he tries to establish a very general 
theory of monetary circulation, not only of the cir-
culation of a particular commodity. The crucial chal-
lenge raised here is to explain why an object without 
intrinsic value or real demand can circulate as pure 
medium of exchange. Walras solves this puzzle prob-
lem giving a great importance to the desynchroniza-
tion of payments. In any case, money is not demand-
ed because of a pure financial reason or because of 
its capacity to preserve value in the medium or long 
term. In the EEPP, money is not a creature of finan-
cial markets. This leads us to the other interesting fea-
ture already mentioned: money supply is determined 
by an endogenous demand for money. This means 
that no endogenous creation of the monetary object 
is considered but the quantity necessary to assure the 
circulation of the real product is endogenously de-
termined. Money is a part of the initial endowments 
of some agents and Walras only makes some sim-
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ple analyses of comparative statics concerning the 
quantity of money in circulation. These analyses are 
always related to non-explained exogenous shocks. 
When a different quantity of money is considered, 
the adjustment variable is the price of the services 
as medium of exchange furnished by money. Any 
expansion on the initial money holdings of agents 
produces a decrease in the price of that service and a 
consequent rise of prices in terms of money.
After considering the case of a non-commodity 
form of money, Walras concludes the 30th lesson of 
EEPP with a short but very important analysis of 
commodity money. The reasoning is obviously di-
rected towards a theory of the variations on the price 
of metallic money. Walras’s main conclusion, not 
surprisingly, is that there exists a natural tendency of 
the real price of the commodity (in his commodity 
market) to equalize the purchasing power of its mon-
etary form (i.e. coins). The regulation of the value 
of money in a metallic system needs to consider the 
real price theory: scarcity and utility being the main 
forces behind.
b. The nature of metallic money in Walras’s 
Applied Theory of a bimetallic system
The peak of Walras’s attempt to defend the neutrality 
of money, not only theoretically but also in his ap-
plied economics, is summarized in two propositions: 
the necessity for a bimetallic monetary system and 
the abolition of bank issued paper-money. Concern-
ing the former13, it is the consequence of his main 
conclusion about the positive relation between the 
quantity of money and its purchasing power, and his-
torical events Walras faced, namely the depreciation 
of gold and the instability of the price of silver related 
to an increase in its international supply.
According to Walras, the object of any monetary 
policy is to ensure the stability of the price system 
and to avoid the introduction of a cumulative spec-
ulative crisis. Either deflationary or inflationary spi-
rals lead to a distortion of the price mechanism and 
in fine to redistributive effects distorting the mar-
ket allocations. If a price system is working prop-
erly, under perfect competition, the resultant price 
vector guarantees commutative justice. Any redis-
tributive effect is undesirable, provided there is no 
other normative argument on distributive justice14. 
Money-gold or money-silver holders are exposed 
to fluctuations in their purchasing power when the 
economy experiences external shocks on gold and 
silver markets, while debtors see the amount of their 
debts reduced. 
Thus, if a metallic system is the best way to ensure 
the stability of the monetary supply, this system has 
13 I will deal with the second proposition (i.e. the abolition of paper-money) in the next subsection.
14 Walras deals with those distributive issues in his works on “La question sociale” (Walras 1990) and (Walras 2001)
15 «Le monométallisme-or combiné avec un billon d’argent distinct de la monnaie divisionnaire et qu’on introduirait dans la circulation ou quon en 
retirerait de manière à ce que le prix de l’étalon multiple ne variât pas» (Walras, 1992, p. 5)
16 My translation and emphasis.
drawbacks because of the instability of the prices of 
gold and silver as commodities. The system Walras 
proposes to avoid those negative consequences of a 
pure metallic system, sometimes regarded as very cu-
rious, consists in the adoption of a quasi bi-metallic 
system based on the circulation of gold species joint 
with the possibility of introducing a secondary form 
of species, named “regulator-billon” made of silver, 
when gold-money becomes scarce —either because 
of an “exportation” of the metal or an increasing use 
of it as an industrial input15. Walras presents this sys-
tem as a very rigid rule to maintain price stability; a 
rule that can even be mathematically established and 
given to the State for application. Walras insists on 
the necessity of the intervention of the State in mon-
etary matters, contrary as he says, to “the dominant 
tendency towards laissez-faire” (Walras, 1992, p. 
11) of his time. He defends a permanent intervention 
based on mathematical rules. That is the deep spirit 
of Walras’s monetary policy. 
The mono-metallic system with a quasi-bimetal-
lic regulation, apart from its evident complexity, is a 
clear evidence of the nature of money Walras defend-
ed: the only form of money necessary for the eco-
nomic system to work properly (perfect competition) 
is a stable metallic medium of exchange. Money sup-
ply must be regulated and stabilized and monetary 
policy needs to guarantee that the quantity of money 
in circulation does not exceed the necessities of the 
real price system derived from the general equilibri-
um equations. 
However, historical reality is against Walras’s 
plans. The existence of a de facto bimetallic circu-
lation and most important the increasing part of pa-
per-money and other forms of payments are a sting-
ing truth Walras understood well: 
It is a curious fact, and worth to be noticed con-
cerning monetary theory, that it has been considered as 
a first progress to adopt money and, when it exists, to 
consider as a second progress to withdraw it. There are 
in fact an important number of instruments of payment, 
whose importance is ever increasing, without the in-
tervention of metallic money. Those are: (…) Credits 
on books, (…) Exchange letters, (…) Bank notes (…). 
(Walras 1988, pp. 517-519)16.
The actual monetary circulation is composed 
of different forms of money. But what can be said, 
from a theoretical point of view, about those monies? 
That is the central question Walras is trying to tackle 
with his apparently purely applied analysis of bank 
issued-money. We have now the elements to under-
stand the second stronghold of Walras’s monetary 
policy: the abolition of the bank-issued paper money. 
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c. «Théorie appliqué du billet de banque»: A 
theory for monetary policy 
So far, I have studied the pure theoretical nature of 
money as exposed in the EEPP and the more applied 
features of the nature of metallic money. Both aspects 
are strongly related within Walras’s propositions con-
cerning the abolition of paper-money. I shall now 
show that this radical posture against any form of 
circulation other than his quasi-bimetallic system is 
based on a difficulty of his pure economics and the 
necessity to solve it when he develops his applied ar-
guments.
Walras formulated the central question of his 
TMBB as a pure policy matter: 
The production of bank notes ought to be made by 
the State, or by a unique bank endowed of monopoly 
power conditioned to a strict agenda, or by an undeter-
mined number of free banks? (Walras 1992, p. 311)17
It is worth noting that Walras explicitly considered 
the difference between an independent and a gov-
ernment controlled central bank. The policy issue at 
stake is not only the traditional debate on free bank-
ing or monopoly. Most of the French participants in 
this debate —Walras’s contemporaries18— centered 
their positions on the option between free banking vs. 
a central bank; the latter being either a public or a 
private institution. By recognizing the difference be-
tween a central bank guided by government changing 
policies and one guided by a strict rule (i.e. cahier de 
charges) Walras acknowledges the importance of the 
debate held in England between the banking and the 
currency school. However, his answer is very original 
regarding both forms of the debate. Walras declares a 
radical opposition against any form of paper-money 
thus putting the problem on different grounds: a the-
oretical discussion of policy matters. 
I noted at the beginning of this analysis of Walras’s 
theory that his presentation of a pure theory of money 
tries to avoid any reference to the capital nature of 
money holdings. Monetary demand, in the pure theo-
retical view, is determined because of the necessity of 
a medium of exchange to assure the circulation of the 
real value of production. Money supply is thus giv-
en by money demand, and artificially established by 
an equilibrium equation of the money service market 
from which can be automatically obtained the price 
of money in terms of a numéraire commodity. Some 
scholars have interpreted this feature of Walras’s the-
ory of money as an incompatible theory of monetary 
supply. Following Bauvert (2004), the general coher-
ence of Walrasian monetary theory is threatened by 
an exogenous money supply in his EEPP that would 
17 My translation.
18 One of the most important groups of intellectuals advocating free banking during the second half of the 19th century in France is related to the 
Journal des Économistes (Molinari, Guyot, Bastiat, Chevalier) 
19 See the original 29th lesson of the second edition of the EEPP where he criticized Cournot’s conception of an “absolute” measure of value.
20 See (Walras 1988, p. 449)
be incompatible with an endogenous money supply 
of the TMMB. Even if this is apparently true, as it 
could be thought from what has been said so far in 
this text, I have a slightly different interpretation. 
Walras exposed his radical opposition against 
any form of fiat money at different places in his pure 
and applied texts. A common trait of this idea, that is 
present even before the development of his TMBB, 
is that there cannot be a commodity or any other ob-
ject serving as an invariable standard of measure of 
value19. The reason for this is simple: values are in 
fine determined by subjective elements —subjective 
scarcity and preferences— and the very idea of an 
objective standard of measure is incompatible with 
a subjective theory of value. Nonetheless, the deep 
nature of money as pure medium of exchange can-
not be separated from its use as a standard of val-
ue. If every commodity is to be exchanged against 
money, the actual vector price of the economy is nat-
urally established in a nominal form —in terms of 
money. However, Walras always tried to avoid this 
practical evidence by proposing an interesting differ-
ence between the commodity serving as numéraire 
(commodity A in his notation) and the object serv-
ing as medium of exchange (commodity U in his 
notation20). This latter being, as I already said, is a 
pure medium of exchange without any other private 
utility. This implies this object can only change its 
value, following Walras’s theory of prices, according 
to its quantity. Any subjective source of value tak-
en apart, the monetary object of the pure economics 
is obviously neutral and quantity theory holds. This 
is Walras’s theoretical artifice needed to present his 
ideal type system in his pure economics. The conclu-
sion is thus that money supply needs to be adjusted 
to its demand as medium of exchange if any general 
perfect competition equilibrium, with its normative 
properties, is to be attained. 
Any perturbation of the supply quantity will trig-
ger an increase of the service of availability of money 
in terms of a numéraire commodity and a consequent 
diminishing purchasing power of money. A last con-
sequence of this conception is that money supply 
must be equal to the medium of exchange demand, 
and the actual price of money in terms of a numérai-
re becomes a theoretical tautology. This price is de-
termined by a very simple quantity theory equation 
and the whole nature of the stock of money as form 
of capital or a support for savings is neglected. But 
Walras knew and made it explicit, with his charac-
teristic academic honesty, that the applied monetary 
questions pushed him to abandon the hypothetical 
conception of a fixed supply of money.
When Walras presents the applied theory of 
money, money’s nature as a form of capital returns 
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to the front of the scene. Walras is confronted to a 
very hard problem: all forms of intra-period media 
of exchange are forms of capital from an interperiod 
point of view. The exchange instruments have dif-
ferent forms according to its support as capital. An 
important question arises here: why did Walras not 
include this analysis in his pure economics? The an-
swer, I advance, is this: any demand for money as a 
form of capital opens the door to redistributive and 
expectational distortions. These distortions lead to an 
allocation which is different from those which are Pa-
reto optima —or, in Walras’s terms, to distortions of 
commutative justice.
This interpretation could seem contradictory with 
the conceptual framework Walras built to introduce 
money within his value theory. That is, an inter-tem-
poral framework with capital goods and savings. 
Walras even establishes a demand for money as a 
form of capital. Money holdings (encaisse désirée) 
appear to be a way of preserving wealth. Walras also 
considers that in a pure theoretical situation the whole 
capital takes a monetary form and it is borrowed by 
entrepreneurs21. Money capital and capitalist’s sav-
ings are identical. Workers’ and landowners’ savings 
are also monetized. But, when Walras establishes the 
money supply for an individual, he presents it as be-
ing the total quantity of money from the last period 
(savings) minus its own demand as medium of ex-
change and savings for the next period. Adding for all 
agents, and given a fixed quantity of money between 
periods, we can note that in equilibrium the whole 
monetary demand is zero because the whole supply 
of money for a given period can only be the amount 
of savings from the last period:
The left side represents the net monetary demand 
for the actual period (t) and the right side the total 
money supply of the actual period. From which re-
sults a nil gross demand for the actual period:
Walras’s mistake is due to a flaw in his definition 
of the money supply. In fact, when he considers the 
way an entrepreneur gets money to pay its input costs 
other than labor, Walras only considers the case of 
capitalists lending money to them by the intermedia-
tion of a bank. But the banks are a pure device to 
transfer capitalists’ deposits (savings) to entrepreneu-
rs. At the end of the period, the entrepreneurs receive 
the needed quantity of money to repay capitalists and 
workers by means of their sales. In a stationary state 
situation, money plays a pure role of medium of ex-
change transferred between periods (interperiod) to 
21 It is important to remember a particular theoretical difference established by Walras: entrepreneurs are the direct producers, they search to maximize 
benefits choosing an adequate technique and inputs; capitalists are the owners of capital, consumers and not producers, lending its capital goods or 
monetary capital to entrepreneurs and earnings the price or the loan for it.
22 My translation.
realize payments during a given period (intraperiod). 
But what does all this have to do with banks and pa-
per-money? The answer to this question is the expla-
nation of Walras’s main concern about the dangers of 
paper-money. 
When Walras considers banks from the point of 
view of pure economics but on the grounds of applied 
economics, he defines them as a form of entrepreneu-
rs, with a profit maximizing logic. Being more than 
a simple automatic booking and money transfer sys-
tem, as they are as long as pure economics is conside-
red, now the banks have a private economic logic that 
threatens the whole economic system: the capacity to 
create a new money supply. 
Banks carry out this capacity when they go be-
yond the intermediary function and create a new de-
mand for economic projects. As mentioned above, 
Walras establishes two distinct categories of agents: 
capitalists and entrepreneurs. The supply of capital 
goods, in fine of capital money, is the capitalists’ 
main role. Entrepreneurs create products or servi-
ces and maximize profits through their sales and te-
chnological decisions. The problem with banks is 
they are a sort of monster within this categorization 
of agents. When a bank decides to lend money to 
an entrepreneur supported upon no capitalist de-
mand, they are, not only increasing money supply, 
but also artificially creating a demand for capital. 
Banks are playing a double role as entrepreneurs 
and capitalists:
One must go further than Coquelin and declare 
that paper money issued by banks pushes the limits of 
credit by allowing banks and bankers to lend money to 
entrepreneurs without any capitalist. 
(…) The issue of bank notes up to an amount leads 
to the increase of the same amount of capital. (Walras 
1992, p. 319)22
The entire predictions of the pure economics 
model of money, as presented in the last version in 
the EEPP, are threatened. In fact, Walras put this 
problem in terms of a question: which is the differ-
ence between metallic and paper money? His answer 
is this:
[The difference is twofold]: First, metallic money 
has a value in itself, while bank notes only represent 
the value of the capital goods they will be traded for, 
and they have no value when those capital goods lose 
their value; second, after having lent their metallic 
money for the first time, the banks and bankers are in a 
way compelled to lend it anew indefinitely, otherwise 
this value would be idle, whereas the possibility to lend 
paper money again depends upon people’s will. (Wal-
ras 1992, p. 320)
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This increase in capital banks produce when is-
suing paper money means an increase in the entre-
preneurs’ capacity to buy more capital goods; but the 
production of new capital goods in order to satisfy 
this demand takes time says Walras (Op cit. p.321). 
During this time, the only effect is a “nominal” in-
crease in the means of payments and a consequent 
depreciation of the price of the whole money supply 
including metallic money23. 
He thinks the increase in the price of capital goods 
disappears as their supply equals their demand and 
the loan is paid back, but the depreciation of metallic 
money persists. Walras’s explanation is as follows: 
the increase in money supply (paper and metallic) re-
duces the price of money by a simple effect of excess 
supply. The real price of metallic money lowering it 
is then converted into commodity metal (i.e. gold for 
the industrial gold market) and then the price of this 
commodity shrinks. Agents exchange gold for paper 
money at the bank and banks’ issue of paper money 
replaces metallic money if the total amount of metal 
goes out of monetary circulation. Beyond this point, 
an inverse movement takes place. This is the ancient 
bullion theory of “gold points”. 
But the novelty of Walras’s argument lies in the 
character of banks as entrepreneurs and artificial cap-
italists. The production of new capital goods to sat-
isfy their demand leads to an increase not only in the 
demand for capital goods but also of land and labor. 
Labor and land being inelastic goods, they become 
more expensive and workers’ and landowners’ sav-
ings increase. These savings are transformed in a form 
of capital less liquid than the paper money issued by 
banks. This quite complex reasoning leads Walras 
to consider that paper money is transformed in fine 
in less liquid assets than metallic money. But what 
about bankers? The argument above leads to the con-
clusion that paper money tends to naturally replace 
metallic money. Walras considers metallic money as 
the most liquid asset because it is the only general-
ly acceptable medium of exchange. Bank notes are 
always subject to uncertainty and even when they 
circulate as medium of exchange, in times of a real 
or financial crisis an important difference between 
paper and metallic money will become evident (Wal-
ras 1992, p. 338).  Bank notes being less liquid than 
metallic money, it is, according to Walras, impossible 
to transform, as fast as required, paper money into 
metallic money. Furthermore, as the central part of 
the argument is that paper money replaces pure liquid 
capital by less liquid capital, the bankers are always 
promising something they cannot deliver. 
Walras also explains that this argument against 
paper money holds whether there is free banking or a 
monopolist central bank. This also holds even if there 
is perfect competition in the banking system or a very 
rigid rule imposed to a central bank. Walras consid-
ers that paper money opens the door to an important 
23 Do not forget that Walras believes in a pure quantity theory of money.
number of distortions of the exchange system and 
those distortions are unavoidable. 
d. Walras’s monetary regulation: no Central 
Bank please, we need a strict rule!
Despite the possible flaws in Walras’s complex ar-
guments, my main interest here was to show that his 
rejection of any paper money circulation is construct-
ed upon theoretical arguments directly derived from 
his pure economics framework. In fact, the problem 
with banks is not their capacity to profit from their 
position as creators of money and capital. That is to 
say, the arguments against banks is not based on a vi-
olation of the commutative justice as is the argument 
against natural monopolies (Walras 1992). In the case 
of monopoly, the Walras’s main concern is the ca-
pacity of those agents to impose their will by means 
of their market power. Natural monopolies must be 
nationalized, as he clearly states regarding railways 
and land. But banks are not by nature monopolists 
because competition among paper money is perfectly 
possible. Walras quotes Coquelin and other famous 
enthusiasts of the free banking system. He even pub-
lished some papers in the Journal des économistes 
himself. He admits the possibility of competition 
among banks to keep them producing reasonable 
amounts of paper money. 
The issue, following Walras, is to be tackled from 
a different point of view. Allowing paper money cir-
culation leads to the introduction of an internal source 
of perturbation. A real variable (i.e. an entrepreneur-
ial activity or a supply of paper money matching a 
real demand in case of a Central Bank) opening the 
door to a distortion of equilibrium results and of the 
stationary system of the EEPP. 
Every form of fiat money represents the same risk 
for the economy. The only monetary system guaran-
teeing general equilibrium perfect competition al-
locations, without introducing the possibility of en-
dogenous crisis, is a system based on a commodity 
money, and a quasi-bimetallic system regulated by 
a very strict rule of circulation. This means, Walras 
is not in favor of a Central Bank producing paper 
money but he actually proposes a system of mone-
tary circulation with a permanent intervention of the 
State according to a very strict mathematical rule. No 
place for discretionary policy is given to this mone-
tary authority. This is not a Central Bank which pro-
duces paper money; it is a regulatory authority of the 
market for gold and silver which must be confounded 
with money market. This authority’s goal is to main-
tain a stable price of money through a permanent 
mechanism of monitoring and intervention. This is 
like the function of modern Central Banks regulating 
a fixed exchange rate.
Having analyzed Walras’s position on paper mon-
ey, we can now turn to Cournot. This comparison will 
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contrast Walras’s complex arguments with the much 
more simple and realistic ones advanced by Cournot. 
This parallel is particularly interesting not only to 
show the differences between authors associated with 
the Marginal Revolution, but also because Walras 
considered Cournot as his most influential forerunner 
in mathematical economics.
2. Cournot: Paper Money regulation as a matter 
of bon sens
Cournot’s monetary theory is not to be found in his 
first and most known work from 1838 (Cournot A. 
2001 [1838]). This well-known piece is his main con-
tribution to a mathematical price theory. But, even 
there, some important points are made about mon-
ey. In the chapters on “absolute value” (chapter 2) 
and “exchange rate” (chapter 3) we find the corner 
stone of Cournot’s theory on the nature of money 
as a human institution necessary for the progress of 
human industry. After some general considerations, 
Cournot studies the determination of the price of me-
tallic money though an algebraic exposition of the 
theories of reflux and “gold points”. At the end of 
Chapter 3 he remits the reader to Adam Smith’s work 
on the exchange rate and the price of metallic money. 
No doubt, this is not enough to build a complete and 
original monetary theory. 
It goes without saying that Cournot’s monetary 
theory has been almost completely neglected com-
pared to his price theory, with the notable exception 
of Loiseau’s (1913) work. In his doctoral dissertation, 
this author shows Cournot gave great importance to 
the study of money, and to the analysis of credit and 
the banking system as a natural, necessary and criti-
cal evolution of the industrial system. 
a. From a static price theoretical framework to 
a long-term institutionalist dynamic analysis: 
Cournot’s economic works from 1838 to 1877
Cournot’s original analysis of monetary matters can 
be found in his two last economic works: (Cournot 
A., 1863) and (Cournot A. 1982 [1877]). Contrary 
to his most known work (1838), in these two texts 
Cournot uses no mathematical language. In the pref-
ace of both works, Cournot explains that by doing 
this he is trying to address a larger public because he 
believes the little success of his first book is due to 
the use of a mathematical language. Cournot gives 
another reason explaining the absence of mathemat-
ics from these works in a letter to Walras published by 
Etienne Antonelli in Econometrica (Cournot, Walras, 
& Jevons 1935, pp. 119-120). In it, Cournot says that, 
due to a serious visual disease, he was forced to use 
a reader since 1830, making it almost impossible for 
him to read and write mathematics. 
24 My translation.
However, these two works are as rigorous as his 
mathematical work. In them, Cournot uses, without 
significant change his main theoretical model of price 
determination as presented in his 1838 book. More-
over, those works also suggest a more mature intel-
lectual production. The possibility to go beyond the 
mathematical language allows him to propose more 
complex and realistic arguments. Besides, the long 
period between the first and the second text (almost 
30 years later) gave Cournot the time to ponder and 
most importantly to read vastly new productions in 
economics. This is more noteworthy considering his 
last work (1877), written as a last theoretical state-
ment that shows a confident sentiment in the triumph 
of his original idea of a mathematical and marginalist 
economic theory. 
In detail, those mature works present a theory of 
long-term economic dynamics. This is their main dif-
ference compared to his first book. In this dynamic 
context, Cournot analyses the role of money in the 
history of economic evolution. His views on mon-
ey are thus determined by a historical conception. 
But this long-term scope is also completed with very 
practical and contemporary debates. Cournot ad-
dresses the questions of free banking and of the regu-
lation of non-metallic money. 
Assuming a long-term historical point of view, 
Cournot presents the evolution of human economy, 
beginning with a primitive rural economy until an 
industrialized one. Money or, better said, the means 
of payments system, naturally evolves from a very 
simple one, allowing few trades among agricultural 
almost autarkic units towards a very complex finan-
cial system and fiat-money. 
Let’s put it briefly (…), first let’s recognize that the 
notion of exchange of one material object against an-
other material object (…) is a very concrete one. But 
the function of a numéraire or of coinage leads, by vir-
tue of language and by the impulse of human mind, to 
consider an idea of value that is at a higher level from 
the point of view of mental abstraction, in a stronger 
relation with human reason and law. It seems very sim-
ple to understand that the people at the origin of arts, 
sciences and jurisprudence have also been at the origin 
of the institution of money within the economic system 
(Cournot A. 1982 [1877], p. 89)24
This quotation summarizes Cournot’s view on the 
nature of money. He advances an institutionalist view 
of the origin and evolution of money. If he recognizes 
that every single rural economy, provided they have 
even a few trades, need to use a common standard of 
value and that this role is naturally given to a particu-
lar commodity, he also considers that the economic 
transformations and progress of societies need the 
development of credit, metallic money and paper 
money. Those are creatures of the human mind, not 
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of nature. The abstract character of paper money and 
of financial instruments is the peak of this institution-
al development. These elements are initially intro-
duced by a profit maximizing action of some agents, 
but they need public powers to become stable and 
to work properly. This is the theoretical background 
for Cournot’s analysis of paper money; very different 
compared to Walras’s theory of the nature of money, 
presented to complete his pure theoretical system.
b. Cournot and the natural propensity towards a 
fiat money system
Cournot conceived paper money as part of an ongoing 
evolution of the payment system. However, this evo-
lution is not a straight monotonic line of permanent 
and positive progress. On the contrary, the raise and 
evolution of paper money is a source of some evil; 
especially, when political power abuses it. Cournot, 
in a very equilibrated and realistic way, presents the 
origin of paper money because of the natural needs 
of a society whose population and wealth are increas-
ing. This is a characteristic of industrial societies not 
of rural stationary ones. 
Technological development, capital accumula-
tion, and the division of labor are the foundations of 
economic growth. These elements cannot flourish 
within a pure metallic monetary system. The reason 
is quite paradoxical. Metallic money was historica-
lly adopted because of its natural stability and stable 
supply. However, the “needs of circulation” of indus-
trial societies are always changing. Crisis and booms 
are strongly tied to industry. Agricultural societies 
are exposed to climatic change, but industry is expo-
sed to human creativity (op. cit. p. 43). 
Following Cournot, the stability of a monetary 
standard is as chimerical as the stationary state of 
an industrial society. Therefore, industrial progress 
needs an institutional agreement on an “artificial” 
standard of value:
Once one has admitted that metallic money25 is not 
a fixed standard of value, that it is exposed to real fluc-
tuations, not only on its relative purchainge power but 
on its own absolute value, it is a natural thing that men 
conceived the idea of a money of account in order to 
deal with the alterations on the value of precious met-
als. (…) So doing, men have not acted in a metaphys-
ical way (…) 
The instauration of a money of account, as reason-
able and fair as it seems when its goal is to better the 
conditions of measuring values avoiding the variations 
of the value of metals (…), becomes a harmful institu-
tion, a source of trouble for the ideas and human con-
science, (…) (Cournot A. 1982 [1877], p. 68)
Cournot considers that money can be used to fi-
nance government expenses, for example in war ti-
25 Cournot uses the word “argent” (silver and money in French) to designate any form of metallic money (1982 [1877], p. 67).
mes, and the abuse of political power is the drawback 
effect of the positive progress related to non-metallic 
money. This is a common trait of his general views 
on money and monetary regulation: a permanent os-
cillation between good and evil, between crises and 
prosperous periods. This corresponds to the spirit of 
a discretionary regulation of the monetary system by 
the State provided it is made within reasonable limits. 
c. Banks, paper-money and monetary Policy: 
three necessary evils
Cournot keeps this pragmatic view when his story 
about the evolution of payment systems arrives to the 
point of the consolidation and spread of paper mon-
ey. He states that paper-money is a necessity, but its 
value is unstable. Therefore, government interven-
tion is needed to set up a common standard value 
and to regulate its production. Banks provide credit 
instruments and in so doing create paper money. Pa-
per money becomes not only a substitute for metallic 
money but an integral part of money supply. Cournot, 
once again, has a very different stand from Walras 
regarding paper money. He believes it cannot be told 
apart from metallic money from the point of view 
neither of common sense nor of pure theory. Trying 
to establish a difference is going against the very na-
ture of the payment system: a necessary device for 
the well-functioning of an industrial economy. 
(…) money is money, a sui generis thing, and it is 
no more a bill of exchange than a commodity, but it 
has some affinities with both. (Cournot A. 1982 [1877], 
pp. 89-90)
The way the government ought to regulate the 
functioning of the monetary system depends on cir-
cumstances. As in Walras, banks lend money and 
create paper money according to need. However, 
Cournot considers that this is a source of growth 
and progress. But this must be handled with care. 
Cournot’s argument is summarized in the following 
quotation:
With good judgment and wisdom on the adminis-
tration of paper-money issue, always harmonizing as 
possible the quantity according to the real circulation 
needs, Government can balance things in order to 
maintain more or less stability of the price of paper 
money: provided that, on its side, the population keeps 
their natural common sense from the excess of either 
panic or infatuation. (Cournot A. , 1863, pp. 263-264)
It is interesting to note that Cournot refers to in-
convertible and legal-tender paper money issued by a 
monopoly bank (i.e. Bank of France). With the usu-
al warnings, he considers that there are some limits 
within which inconvertible paper-money does not 
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harm the economy provided there is a dose of good 
sense (bon sens) of both Government and private 
agents. Cournot does not provide exact formulas for 
bon sens in monetary policy. He considers intuition 
and observation of the ongoing situation of the econ-
omy are more accurate than sophisticated mathemat-
ical theories. 
d. Inconvertible Paper-Money vs. pure metallic 
money
Cournot introduces a similar argument to the one 
Walras uses to explain the consequences of an exces-
sive supply of paper money. This argument is based 
on the well-known mechanism of the gold price as a 
regulator of the price of metallic money: 
The Bank can make use of this power to stimu-
late, to increase general production or the movement 
of enterprises and business, as far as a decrease in the 
value of money (either metallic or paper), and as long 
as it does not trigger a commercial crisis if the move-
ment it produces is too abrupt. To say that bank notes, 
issued beyond the needs of real circulation, will come 
back to the bank in order to redeem them, is to sup-
pose the public confidence has already been demol-
ished. Otherwise, why take paper money back to the 
bank rather than buying metallic money? (Cournot A. 
1863, p. 253)
Contrary to Walras, Cournot believes in the possi-
bility of good consequences of the increase in paper 
money supply within the limits of public confidence. 
He conveys modifications of money supply will dest-
abilize nominal prices and thus the purchasing pow-
er of money. However, he also recognizes that it is 
impossible, under the actual conditions of technolo-
gy and economic knowledge, to implement a better 
monetary system. 
Cournot refers to a bimetallic system, very sim-
ilar to the one Walras imagined, and arrives to the 
conclusion that it is certainly an ideal system, as a 
philosophical matter, but: 
The double metallic standard is less easy to handle 
for any Government, because it implies the difficult 
task of permanent screening and correction of gold and 
silver prices and frequent modifications of the official 
rates as soon as differ too much from commercial rates. 
How could the Government accept that a speculator 
became rich harming consequences the Country (…)? 
And how could the Government impose to its people 
the obligation of receiving a commercially devaluated 
value as their payments? (Cournot A. 1982 [1877], p. 
80)
The permanent threat of speculators is a reality as 
well for metallic money as for paper-money. The im-
plementation of a stable monetary standard is a main 
concern, but a pure metallic system implies too hard 
a task and very strict policies. It is, from this practical 
point of view, an undesirable system.
Governments have other mechanisms to keep the 
circulation of paper money stable. Legal tender is one 
and Cournot also considers the importance of taxa-
tion and public expenses as one of the main forms to 
assure paper money circulation. Under difficult eco-
nomic or political conditions, the Government can 
reasonably decide to stop convertibility. How could 
it be possible to avoid panic and a confidence crisis 
on paper money? The answer is to maintain a stable 
demand for it. Legal tender is an acceptable policy 
when panic or any unreasonable psychological rea-
son is at the origin of a depreciation of convertible 
paper-money. Cournot is extremely clear on this 
matter:
A problem, a suspension of convertibility from the 
Bank, shall be a cause of depreciation of bank notes. 
And as it is impossible to distinguish the limits between 
those psychological phenomena named fright and pan-
ic, the depreciation could lead to the complete failure 
of fiat money, if government did not have the possibil-
ity to take one of these two measures: one consisting 
on accepting them as tax payments at their nominal 
price, the other consisting on compelling legal tender 
for bank notes at their entire nominal value. This last 
solution is by far more adequate in order to allow fast 
and smooth overcoming of a crisis: because for every 
agent the liabilities and payments are taken at the same 
nominal value. (Cournot A. 1982 [1877], p. 76)
The economic rationale for legal-tender policies 
is clear: stability of the contracts is assured by a com-
mon restriction affecting debtors and lenders in the 
same way. The imposition of the payment of taxes 
and public fees in paper money is another possibility 
to support paper money circulation but Cournot also 
acknowledges that this is a dangerous policy because 
it opens the door to Government manipulation. In any 
case, Cournot recognizes and economically justifies 
monetary policies that Walras would reject because 
they are a dangerous threat for the commutative jus-
tice of a market economy. Cournot considers mone-
tary policy as a service public (1863, p. 200), needing 
to be ruled with caution but also discretionary.
3. Concluding remarks: Walras, Cournot and the 
currency school vs. banking school debate
These two important theoreticians advanced origi-
nal thoughts on monetary matters; views that were 
not usual in the monetary debates of their time. The 
historical and intellectual context to which belong 
Walras’s and Cournot’s monetary analyses was dom-
inated by the banking vs. currency schools debate on 
central banks, on the one hand, and by the free bank-
ing vs. central bank divide on the other. These two 
debates had common points and they were related 
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to theoretical views on money. The central issue at 
stake in both debates was the definition of money and 
of paper money and credit instruments. The question 
was whether they could all be considered as part of 
money or if only metallic currency could. Most of the 
arguments were given in terms of liquidity or solva-
bility risk of fiat monetary forms. 
Walras’s monetary policy is not easy to classify 
according to these debates. We can say that Walras 
opposed both free banking and central banking. Ac-
tually, he opposed monetary creation by banks. Even 
if he acknowledges the importance of financial de-
velopments, of stock markets and credit, he considers 
these developments are a permanent source of dan-
ger for the stability of a perfect competitive general 
equilibrium system. His opposition is not based on a 
simple denial of the central role of banks in a dynam-
ic economy; he believes that banks, guided by their 
well-founded self-interest, can disturb economic 
prices. This argument is based on a very intervention-
ist conclusion: the natural function of a free financial 
and credit market is dangerous for a market economy. 
The financial system must be strictly regulated and 
the system of payments must be kept from financial 
fluctuations. His quasi bimetallic system is based on 
strict rules and permanent intervention of the State to 
assure the distinction between finance and credit on 
the one hand and money on the other. Monetary cir-
culation needs to be a neutral device in the economic 
system. 
The walrasian point may be understood as Cur-
rency School principle. Nevertheless, Walras’s prop-
osition is much more extreme and the only similar 
idea that we can find is Irving Fisher’s 100% Money 
(Fisher 1997 [1935]). According to this proposition 
banks are simple mediators between real production 
and savings (Diatkine 2002, p. 151). I have tried to 
show that it tries to avoi9d a difference between the 
theoretical role of banks at work in the EEPP and 
their real role. From the pure economics point of 
view, Walras presents banks as simple deposit banks 
not creating any new form of currency other than a 
mechanical transfer of monetized savings into mon-
etary capital borrowed by entrepreneurs. But, when 
his applied theory considers banks, he is forced to 
recognize the capacity of banks, as entrepreneurs, to 
create new forms of currency. This is a source of per-
turbation and instability. This is what Walras is trying 
to avoid. 
Cournot develops very realistic and midway ap-
preciations of the financial developments of his time. 
He did not present banks or credit or finance as a 
danger but as consequence of progress. However, pa-
per-money and banking could be a source of instabil-
ity: a necessary evil. Cournot did not analyze the case 
of free banking, he always took as given the existence 
of a Bank, a central Bank. He warned about the risks 
of this monopoly but never proposed to eliminate the 
monopoly; instead, he believed it was necessary keep 
its functioning within reasonable limits. He compares 
the Bank of France with the Bank of England on the 
handling of crisis and the instauration of legal tender. 
He concludes the latter played its role better because 
its timing in the imposition of legal was perfect and 
because it withdrew when necessary. Instead, the 
Bank of France was permanently exposed to the ar-
bitrary influence of government and legal tender was 
an instrument to abuse of it.
This pragmatic approach makes very difficult to 
classify Cournot’s monetary thinking. He did not de-
velop an argument “100%” in favor of metallic mon-
ey, but he considered it could be stable if paper-mon-
ey was a complement. Cournot regarded any form of 
credit, fiat money or financial innovation as related 
to the ever-increasing necessities of industrial socie-
ties. His long-term views on the historical evolution 
of economic systems allowed him to present those 
elements at the same level as arts, literature, technol-
ogy, etc.
Cournot always considered practical solutions. 
Easy to implement and always trying to avoid the 
temptation of too complicated “scientific” proposi-
tions on monetary matters. Those “philosophical uto-
pia will always be overtaken by reality”, he ponders 
(Cournot A., 1863, p. 246). This could be his mes-
sage to Walras.
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